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Abstract 
There is considerable debate about the role of wage rigidity in explaining unemployment. 
Despite a large body of empirical work, no consensus has emerged on the extent of wage 
rigidity. Previous attempts to empirically examine wage rigidity have been hampered by 
small samples and measurement error. In this paper we examine nominal wage flexibility in 
Ireland both in the build up to, and during the Great Recession. The Irish case is particularly 
interesting because it has been one of the countries most affected by the crisis. Our main 
analysis is based on earnings data for the entire population of workers in Ireland taken from 
tax returns, which are free of reporting error. We find a substantial degree of downward wage 
flexibility in the pre-crisis period. We also observe a significant change in wage dynamics 
since the crisis began; the proportion of workers receiving wage cuts more than doubled and 
the proportion receiving wage freezes increased substantially. However, there is considerable 
heterogeneity in wage changes, with a significant proportion of workers continuing to receive 
pay rises at the same time as other were receiving pay cuts.  
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1. Introduction 
The issue of whether wages are rigid or flexible is one that has been central to 
macroeconomics for many years. Wage stickiness in either direction is of concern as it can 
explain why nominal shocks translate into real effects.
1
 However there is no consensus on the 
impact of wage rigidity on unemployment. Downward inflexible wages could prevent labour 
markets from clearing causing unemployment to persist. However there is also a literature 
that argues that under depression type conditions, with interest rates close to zero, wage 
flexibility will have little impact on unemployment and may even exacerbate the problem. 
This paper examines the flexibility of wages in the Irish labour market before and during the 
Great Recession. 
The Irish economy provides a very useful setting for examining the flexibility of 
wages. Firstly, the Irish labour market is generally held to be flexible with relatively low 
levels of job protection legislation, above average working time flexibility and above average 
functional flexibility, measured by the ease with which employers can change the content of 
work (Andranik 2008). It is therefore interesting to see if flexibility along these dimensions 
translates into flexibility in wage setting. In the only analysis of Irish microeconometric wage 
data published to date, nominal rigidity was found to be low by international standards 
(Dickens et al. (2007)). However the authors themselves expressed misgivings about the 
quality of the data used and suggested that the Irish results might be due to measurement 
error. In this paper, we use two data sources for which measurement error is likely to be 
much less of an issue; the data we use are also more recent. 
                                                          
1
 Such general wage stickiness is usually explained by menu costs such as the management time costs of 
performance reviews and the administrative costs of adjusting payslip details. 
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A second reason for interest in wage flexibility in Ireland is that the Irish economy 
has sustained a serious downturn in recent years. After a period of very rapid growth from 
1994 to 2007, when the average annual GDP growth rate was over 7%, the economy 
collapsed and the average growth rate over 2008-2011 was -1.75%. There are similar patterns 
for unemployment; having been relatively stable at 4%-5% for most of the early 2000s, the 
unemployment rate rose from 4.5% in 2007 to 12% in 2009 and continued to rise further to 
14.6% in 2011. Inflation averaged 2.53% in the period from 1994 to 2011 but were negative 
in 2009 (-4.5%) and 2010 (-1%). Given these substantial changes in the macroeconomic 
environment, it is very interesting to examine the extent to which wages responded during 
this period. 
The predominant explanation for why wages might be downwardly rigid is that 
employers avoid reducing wages because of the effect on morale. Bewley (1999) examined 
the downward rigidity of wages in the US during the recession of 1991-1992, and found that 
managers used wage cuts only in circumstances where the firm faced serious problems. Since 
the economic crisis in Ireland caused serious problems for many firms, it is plausible that 
downward nominal wage rigidity would be lessened in these years. In addition, Gordon 
(1996), in his comment on Akerlof et al.’s paper on the impact of wage rigidity in a low-
inflation environment, suggests that nominal wage reductions would no longer be seen as 
unfair. The fact that inflation dropped and then turned negative during the crisis might also 
lead us to expect lesser downward nominal wage rigidity.  
In this paper we look at nominal wage changes over the pre-crisis and post-crisis 
periods using a newly-available administrative panel dataset covering the population of Irish 
workers, known as the ‘Job Churn’ data. The very large number of observations (700,00-
800,000 in the subset of the data that we study) allows for the examination of the wage 
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change distribution at a level of detail not previously possible. In addition, because these data 
are derived from employee records returned to the tax authorities by employers, they are free 
from the reporting errors that plague analyses of survey-based data. We also use the Irish 
component of the EU-SILC to carry out some supplementary analyses; although based on 
survey data, the EU-SILC includes additional controls that allow us to examine some possible 
explanations for the patterns we observe in the Job Churn data.  
 We find a significant degree of downward wage flexibility in the pre-crisis period in 
both annual earnings and hourly wages. We also observe a significant response in wage 
change behaviour since the crisis began; the proportion of workers receiving wage cuts more 
than doubled and the proportion receiving wage freezes increased substantially. However, 
there is considerable heterogeneity in wage changes, with a significant proportion of workers 
continuing to receive pay rises at the same time as other were receiving pay cuts.  
 
2. Literature Review 
There is a substantial body of research that uses microdata to examine the extent of wage 
stickiness. However, as of yet no general consensus has emerged. Much of this work has 
focused on the US and UK. McLaughlin (1994) analysed PSID data and concluded that 
wages in the US were flexible; 43% of household heads who did not change employers faced 
real wage cuts annually, while approximately 17% of the sample faced nominal wage cuts. 
However, these results have been challenged by a number of authors who argue that the 
extent of wage cuts in these data may be exaggerated by measurement error. Altonji and 
Devereux (2000) using both firm level personnel files and household survey data conclude 
that nominal wage cuts are rare once one accounts for measurement error. More recently 
Barattieri et al. (2010), using an alternative identification strategy, reach a similar conclusion.  
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Looking at quarterly SIPP data they find that in a typical quarter in 1996, 48.1% of the survey 
report a different wage than in previous quarter. However, when adjusted for measurement 
error this falls to 17.8%.  
For the UK, Smith (2000) uses the 1991-1996 British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS) to examine wage rigidity. Her initial results indicate that 9% of job stayers 
experienced zero nominal wage changes from year to year, and that 23% experienced 
nominal wage reductions. To examine the consequences of measurement error, she uses the 
fact that the BHPS records whether respondents consulted their pay slips when answering the 
wage question. On the assumption that measurement error should be lower for those who 
consult their pay slips than for those who do not, a comparison of these two groups can be 
used to identify the impact of measurement on wage changes. In contrast to the results for 
Altonji and Devereux (2000) and Barattieri et al. (2010), she finds that measurement error in 
household surveys leads to an understatement of the extent of wage flexibility. The 
proportion of workers reporting no wage change falls from 9% to 5.6% when the sample is 
restricted to those who consult their payslip. She attributes this difference to rounding error 
and notes that in contrast to classical measurement error, rounding errors may lead 
researchers to understate the degree of wage flexibility; for example, a worker whose wage 
was €10.75 last year and €11.25 this year may round to €11 in both years.  
Evidence of wage changes for other countries is more limited. Dickens et al. (2007) 
report the results of the International Wage Flexibility Project, which analyses individual 
earnings in 31 different data sets from 16 countries. They find that on average, 8% of workers 
receive nominal wage freezes, and in many countries wage cuts are rare so that wage change 
distributions are typically asymmetric. Ireland is unusual in that there is a lower incidence of 
wage freezes, and almost as many wage cuts are reported as would be if the wage cut 
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distribution were symmetric. They argue that the data used for the Irish analysis, the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) may explain the unusual Irish results, as it 
contains fewer observations and more reporting errors than the datasets available for other 
countries. 
Barwell and Schweitizer (2007), Bauer et al. (2007) and Devicienti et al. (2007) use a 
common methodology that corrects for measurement error in order to identify real and 
nominal wage rigidities in the U.K., Germany and Italy respectively.
2
 They find far less 
downward nominal wage rigidity than earlier studies that corrected for measurement error. 
Researchers have begun to examine wage adjustment in the Great Recession. Blundell 
et al. (2013) examine payroll data from the National Employment Survey (NES) data for the 
UK and find that wages have responded much more to the current recession than to previous 
recessions. The number of workers experiencing wage freezes has increased from 
approximately 5% in 1990 to 12% in 2011. However, in line with Smith’s (2000) results 
based on survey data, they find a significant degree of downward wage flexibility in their 
payroll data; they find that throughout the 1990s and 2000s, almost 20% of stayers report a 
nominal wage cut.  
Daly et al. (2012) argue that downward nominal wage rigidity has been a key reason 
for the limited extent of real wage reductions in the U.S. in recent years. Elsby et al. (2013) 
examine wage adjustments in the US in more detail and caution against relying on nominal 
wage stickiness to explain the high unemployment rates observed during the Great Recession. 
They report several key features of the wage adjustment process. First, there is always a 
significant spike at zero in the wage change distribution – between 6% and 20% of workers 
report exactly the same nominal wage in both years. Secondly, there is always a non-trivial 
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 A non-technical discussion of the estimator used in these papers is given in Goette et al. (2007). 
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fraction of workers (between 10% and 20%) who report nominal wage reductions. Thirdly, 
while the zero-spike increased during the Great Recession, the increase was not substantial, 
and layoffs were not significantly more prevalent than in earlier severe recessions. Based on 
their analysis of US data, they suggest that the high unemployment of the Great Recession 
would have been nearly as high in a world with completely flexible wages. They also analyse 
UK NES data and find a smaller spike at zero than in the US data, which they attribute to the 
greater accuracy of the UK payroll-based data. Like Blundell et al. (2013), they find that 
nominal wage cuts are frequent in the UK. 
 To our knowledge, apart from the Dickens et al. (2007) paper cited above that 
used ECHP data from 1994-2001, there has been no study of wage changes in Ireland using 
microdata. Several recent papers have used a 2007/2008 survey of European firms 
undertaken for the Wage Dynamics Network to investigate the extent to which wages show 
downward rigidity and the reasons for this. Du Caju et al. (2013) find that only 2% of firms 
report having cut wages over the previous five years; the figure for Ireland was just 1%. 
Babecký et al. (2010) report that 9.6% of firms froze base wages, with a corresponding figure 
for Ireland of 9%. 
 Walsh (2012) uses the Earnings, Hours and Employment Costs Survey (EHECS) to 
examine wage changes during the recession. The EHECS is an employer-based survey that 
collects information on employment and the firm’s total wage bill, and so allows the 
calculation of average wages in a firm. In addition, it has surveyed firms about the nature of 
their responses to the recession. Walsh finds that 23% of establishments report cuts in 
average hourly earnings between 2008 and 2009, rising to 31% between 2009 and 2010. 
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Bergin et al. (2012) use repeated cross-sectional data from the EHECS and Irish NES
3
 and 
find that in the private sector, average earnings and average labour costs increased marginally 
between 2006 and 2009, while there was no change between 2009 and 2011.  
 
3. Irish Policy Response to the Crisis. 
As noted earlier, Ireland was one of the countries worst affected by the Great Recession, with 
output falling by over 10% in real terms between 2008 and 2010. The effects of the global 
recession felt elsewhere were compounded in Ireland by the bursting of a property bubble 
that had inflated during the early 2000s and the subsequent collapse of output and 
employment in the construction industries. Because bank lending was so highly concentrated 
in construction activities, Irish banks experienced huge losses following this collapse. On foot 
of this banking crisis, the Irish government took the decision to guarantee all liabilities of 
Irish banks in September 2008. However, continued falling tax revenue and exposure to 
growing bank liabilities resulted in the Irish government deficit going from almost zero in 
2008 to 7.4% in 2009, 13.9% in 2010 and a remarkable 30.8% in 2011, when banking losses 
crystallized. As a result of the outlook for government finances, yields in Irish bonds reached 
unsustainable levels in 2010, and the government sought and accepted a rescue package from 
the EU, ECB and IMF. 
The crisis resulted in the government undertaking a severe programme of austerity 
measures, combining tax increases and expenditure cuts. In addition, the government 
abandoned the national wage setting process that had been in place since 1987, in which 
unions and participating employers bargained at a national level over wage increases, with 
tax cuts being offered by the government to encourage wage moderation.
4
 The immediate aim 
                                                          
3
 Despite having the same name as the UK dataset, the Irish version does not allow individual workers to be 
followed over time. 
4
 There is evidence that the nationally-negotiated wage increases came to be regarded as a floor in the private 
sector during the boom years. As a result, there was a perception that public-sector pay had fallen behind that in 
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of these measures was to reduce the government deficit. A longer-term aim was to effect an 
internal devaluation; as a member of the euro area, a nominal exchange rate devaluation was 
not possible for Ireland, and so only a substantial increase in competitiveness through cuts in 
labour and other costs could reduce real exchange rates and return the economy to its long-
run equilibrium level of output.  
Tax increases began in 2009, when the government introduced a new income levy of 
1% on incomes up to €100,100 and 2% on income above that. These rates were doubled soon 
afterwards
5
. 2011 also saw the abolition of the income ceiling on social contributions and a 
reduction in the upper threshold of the standard tax rate, so that the highest tax rate now 
applied to income above €32,800 as opposed to €36,400. The standard VAT rate was 
increased from 21% to 23% in 2012. In addition, a range of new taxes such as a household 
property tax, a tax on second homes, charges for water usage and a new carbon tax were 
introduced in an attempt to raise revenue.  
At the same time as taxes were increasing, 2010 and 2011 saw cuts in the rate of 
support provided to most social welfare recipients, especially the young unemployed. In 
addition the rate of universal child benefit was reduced over successive years, particularly for 
larger families.  
The government also set out to cut payroll costs in the public sector substantially by 
reducing staff and directly cutting pay. Employment in the public sector was reduced through 
a major programme of early retirement along with a hiring ban. The number employed fell 
from 417,600 in the second quarter of 2009 to 377,300 in the second quarter of 2013, a fall of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the private sector, which the government dealt with by commissioning a ‘benchmarking’ report that was 
intended to redress this gap. In the benchmarking exercise, public sector employees were given an average pay 
rise of 8.9%, paid between 2003 and 2005. 
5
 In 2011 both the income levy and the existing health levy were combined into a new tax called the ‘Universal 
Social Charge’. 
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almost 10%. Pay rates in the public sector were initially reduced via a Pension Levy 
introduced in 2009 ranging from 5% on incomes of €15,000-€20,000 to 10.5% on earnings 
above €60,000. Further pay cuts were implemented in 2010, 6 ranging from 5% on the first 
€43,000 to 10% on income above €70,000. Most recently, the Haddington Road Agreement 
(2013) introduced additional wage cuts on higher paid workers, ranging from 5.5% on those 
earning from €65,000 to €80,000 to 10% on earnings over €185,000. In addition, there were 
increases in hours worked by all public sector workers, the reduction or elimination of 
overtime rates, and lower pay scales for new entrants into professions such as teaching. 
Throughout this period, there has also been severe curtailment of promotions. However, it 
should be noted that incremental pay increases, laid down in public sector contracts of 
employment, continued to be paid until 2013, when they were delayed.  
Surprisingly given these government implemented pay cuts and the abandonment of 
national wage bargaining, aggregate data indicate only modest falls in hourly pay rates 
among public sector workers and stability in the wages of private sector workers since the 
onset of the crisis (Barrett and McGuinness, 2012). This would suggest that Ireland has been 
unable to achieve the necessary internal devaluation through wage reductions, perhaps 
indicating a substantial degree of wage rigidity. However, as acknowledged by the authors, 
these aggregate data suffer from a number of drawbacks. First it is difficult to control for 
compositional changes in the workforce that have taken place during the crisis. If workers 
who have lost their jobs differ from those who continue to be employed then basing average 
wages only on the population of workers will be misleading. Secondly even if the aggregate 
wage change is relatively small this may be hiding substantial differences in wage 
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 These cuts were implemented as part of the Financial Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (No 2) Act 
2009, which came into effect on 1 January, 2010. 
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adjustments across individuals. By following the earnings of individuals over time we 
address both these issues. 
 
4. Data 
Two datasets are used in the analysis. Our main analysis is based on data taken from the Job 
Churn (JC) dataset, which is an administrative dataset covering the years 2005-2011 that has 
been compiled by the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The data combines three elements: first 
data on annual income and weeks worked are provided by the tax authorities (the Revenue 
Commissioners); the data come from P35 returns, which must be submitted each year by each 
employer in respect of every worker who was an employee during that year. To these data are 
added information on workers’ age, sex and social welfare class from the Department of 
Social Welfare. Finally, data from the CSO’s own Central Business Register is added to 
provide information on the sector in which the firms operate and the enterprise’s legal form.  
There are several strong advantages to using the JC data to examine changes in wages 
over time. Firstly, because they are administrative data, based on tax returns, they are largely 
free from measurement error; it is a criminal offence to misreport workers’ earnings in these 
returns. Secondly, the data comprise the entire population of employees in Ireland and so the 
number of observations is large enough to allow very detailed analysis of job changes; there 
are up to three million employment records in any year. Thirdly, since employers are obliged 
to file these returns for every worker, problems associated with non-response and attrition are 
absent from the data. Finally, the data covers both the period before the crisis (2005-2008) 
and the period since (2009-2011).  
The earnings variable available in the JC data is annual ‘reckonable’ income for the 
calendar year; this is gross income after pension contributions have been deducted, as pension 
contributions are not taxable (up to a limit on the contribution that increases with age). The 
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disadvantage of such a measure of annual income is that changes in pension contributions by 
individuals will lead to overstatements of the degree of wage changes, both positive and 
negative. However, there is a significant advantage to this measure too: it allows us to take 
into account the Public Sector Pension Levy, mentioned in Section 3 above. Since this levy 
reduced earnings and entailed no compensating increase in pension entitlements it had the 
same effect as a reduction in gross pay, but it does not register as such in household surveys 
that record gross earnings; hence, commentaries on the extent of wage flexibility in Ireland, 
particularly in the public sector, routinely include a disclaimer that the analysis cannot take 
into account the Public Sector Pension Levy and therefore understates the true extent of pay 
cuts. We will be able to take the Pension Levy into account. Unfortunately, the JC data 
contain no information on hours worked, so it is not possible to distinguish between cuts in 
hourly pay and cuts in hours worked in these data. For this reason, we supplement the 
analysis of the JC data with an analysis of another data source, the Irish component of the 
EU-Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). 
EU-SILC data is collected to satisfy a requirement that all members of the European 
Union collect cross-sectional and longitudinal information on income and living conditions; 
in Ireland, this requirement is implemented using a dedicated survey. About 5,000 
households are interviewed annually. To satisfy the longitudinal requirements, most of the 
households are re-interviewed for four successive years, with one quarter of the panel being 
dropped on a rotating basis in any given year, and replaced with new interview households. 
This means that in the data for any given year, up to three-quarters can be traced back to the 
previous year. The period covered by the data is the years 2004-2011. 
In the Irish data, the ‘income reference year’ for the annual income variable is the 12 
months prior to interview, and interviews are carried out on a rolling basis throughout the 
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year. This means that, for example, the annual income of someone interviewed in July 2012 
will in fact refer to seven months of 2012 and five months of 2011; exact matching to a given 
calendar year is not possible. We have adopted the convention of taking annual income 
recorded in a given year as referring to that calendar year. 
A separate income variable is also recorded in the data that refers to current income; 
to be precise, it records the income received in the last pay cheque. For this variable, there is 
no ambiguity about the year referred to. Other important details are also recorded, such as the 
period covered by the pay cheque, whether it was the usual pay, whether it included overtime 
payments and weeks, days and hours worked. Respondents were encouraged to consult their 
pay slips, and whether they did or not was also recorded. Based on this current income 
variable, an hourly wage variable is also included in the dataset. This is constructed using the 
information provided on hours worked.  
All income variables were subject to careful cleaning by the CSO. This initially 
involved checking for consistency with the occupation variables provided, but also checking 
the information on pay and weeks worked and any job changes against the P35 information 
provided to the Revenue Commissioners by all employers. In a few cases where other 
documentation was missing, information from P60 forms, which are provided to all 
employees by employers, was used. Because respondents were encouraged to check their 
payslips before responding and because the data were subsequently extensively cleaned prior 
to public release, we expect that reporting error is likely to be less important in the EU-SILC 
than in the ECHP used by Dickens et al. (2007), even though both are survey data sources. 
For both datasets, we focus on job stayers, those who remain with the same employer 
in successive years. In the JC data, this was based on matching worker identifiers and firm 
identifiers across pairs of years. Any worker working for the same firm across two calendar 
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years is therefore identified as a stayer. It should be noted, however, that workers may have 
changed roles within the firm, and so they may have changed jobs even if they did not change 
employer. In the EU-SILC data, respondents were asked if they had changed job, and if so, 
when. Job changes were defined to include promotions at work, so in this case it is possible 
to identify individuals whose responsibilities had not changed.  
For both datasets, we also restrict our samples to workers who had worked for the full 
year in each pair of years. In the JC data, the weeks worked for the employer is recorded, so 
we exclude workers who worked for less than 52 weeks in either year. We also exclude all 
workers who had multiple jobs and all self-employed workers. In the EU-SILC data, 
respondents were asked about their employment status – including whether any employment 
was on a part-time or full-time basis – in each of the 12 months prior to the interview, and 
from this, it was possible to identify individuals who had worked in each month in the 
income reference year. As noted earlier, there are no hours data available in the JC data and 
so for ease of comparison, we include both part-time and full-time workers in the EU-SILC 
sample. The possibility that workers changed hours of work during the observation period is 
an issue that we return to later. 
Because of the different wage-setting mechanisms that pertain in the public and 
private sectors, we supplement our overall analysis with separate examinations of these 
sectors. There is no public sector identifier in the JC data. However, the enterprise’s NACE 
code and its legal form can be combined to give a good indication of which sector an 
individual works in. When defining public sector workers, we omit workers in commercial 
state enterprises (‘semi-state bodies’) to the extent possible. 
After imposing these restrictions, the number of observations remaining lies between 
700,000 and 800,000 in the JC data, and between 800 and 1,700 in the EU-SILC data. 
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5. Results 
a. Analysis of Job Churn Data 
To analyze wage dynamics, we first look at annual earnings changes in the JC data for each 
pair of years between 2005 and 2011. Following Ziliak et al. (2011), we calculate percentage 
earnings changes using the arc percent change method. In particular the percentage change in 
earnings is measured as , where yit is earnings for person i in time t and . 
The key advantage of this method is that it is symmetric in gains and losses.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the annual earnings changes from 2005/2006 
to 2010/2011. Column 2 shows the median earnings changes for each pair of years. The 
growth in earnings in the pre-crisis period is evident in the numbers reported for 2005/2006 
and 2007/2008, with median growth rates of between 4.5% and 6.1%. The impact of the 
crisis is clearly observed in the later period, with median wage reductions of about 1% in 
2008/2009 and 2009/2010. These wage changes are consistent with the relatively small 
changes in average earnings reported by Barrett and McGuinness (2012). However, as noted 
earlier, aggregate measures may hide important differences across the distribution. Columns 
3-5 report the proportion of workers receiving an earnings freeze, an earnings cut and an 
earnings rise. Similar to Blundell et al. (2013), we classify a change of less than 0.1% as an 
earnings freeze. These data reveal substantial flexibility. In the pre-crisis period, we find that 
between 17% and 23% of workers experience earnings cuts. These findings are similar to the 
UK findings of Blundell et al. (2013) who found, using payroll data, that during the 1990s 
and 2000s almost 20% of job stayers report a nominal wage cut.  
Not surprisingly, during this period in Ireland between 74% and 80% of employees 
received earnings increases. However, this pattern changed dramatically with the onset of the 
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crisis. The proportion of workers experiencing earnings cuts increased to more than 50% in 
both 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. This figure fell slightly in 2010/2011, but was still high at 
39%. While these figures illustrate a significant wage response to the crisis, it is important to 
note that while many workers were having their earnings cut in recent years, a substantial 
proportion of workers experienced earnings increases. In fact, the proportion of workers who 
experienced increased earnings never fell below 40% over this period. 
Dickens et al. (2007) propose a simple measure of downward nominal wage rigidity, 
which is based on the assumption that everyone who had a nominal wage freeze would have 
had a nominal wage cut in the absence of any rigidity. The measure is defined as the ratio of 
the proportion of workers receiving cuts to the proportion receiving either cuts or freezes. In 
Dickens et al.’s cross country comparison, they found that the average degree of downward 
rigidity across years and datasets was 28%. Their average for Ireland was 4%, the lowest of 
all countries covered, but as noted earlier, they expressed reservations about the Irish data. 
We have calculated the same measure and report our findings in the final column of Table 1. 
These figures show that rigidity was about 11%-12% in the pre-crisis period; although these 
figures are higher than that reported by Dickens et al. for Ireland, they are comparable to the 
numbers reported for Denmark and France, which are the two most flexible countries after 
Ireland. At the onset of the crisis, measured downward rigidity fell substantially to 6% in 
2008/2009 and 7.4% in 2009/2010, and then rose again to 14.7% in 2010/2011. 
To look at these earnings changes in more detail, Figure 1 shows the histograms of 
annual earnings changes in each of the years. The very large sample sizes in the JC data allow 
us to describe the distribution of earnings dynamics in great detail. The red line in each 
histogram indicates an earnings freeze, defined as a change in annual earnings of less than 
0.1%. These histograms display many of the features of wage dynamics noted by Elsby et al. 
17 
 
(2013) in their discussion of US wages. Firstly, in each year we note a significant spike in the 
nominal earnings change distribution at zero. Secondly, there is always a non-trivial fraction 
of workers who report nominal earnings reductions. This could reflect changes to overtime 
rates or reductions in hours worked as well as changes in hourly rates; we will return to this 
issue later in the paper. Thirdly, the spike at zero increased during the Great Recession. 
However, in contrast to Elsby et al. (2013), the increase in the spike at zero for Irish workers 
during the Great Recession is much more dramatic than in the US, with the height of the 
spike doubling in Ireland between 2007/2008 and 2010/2011. Furthermore, the main increase 
in the spike occurred in 2010/2011, following two years of substantial earnings cuts. We 
might have expected that if wage rigidity were a strong feature of the wage setting process, 
the strongest increase in the zero spike would have occurred in the early years of the crisis. In 
future research, it will be interesting to examine whether those workers receiving an earnings 
freeze in later years were the same workers who had previously experienced significant cuts 
in earnings.  
Another notable feature of these histograms is that the increased spike at zero was 
also accompanied by a substantial increase in the proportion of workers receiving pay cuts. 
Interestingly, for those affected by pay cuts, the median cut in each of the years from 
2005/2006 to 2009/2010 was relatively stable at 5%-6%, falling somewhat in 2010/2011 to 
3.7%. 
A major focus of policy discussion during the crisis centred on the relative wage 
adjustments in the public and private sectors. Table 2 presents earnings dynamics separately 
for public and private sector workers. Looking at the pre-crisis years, we see that the earnings 
behaviour was relatively similar in both sectors; between 17% and 23% of workers in both 
sectors received pay cuts, with 74%-84% receiving pay increases. A comparison of the 
18 
 
experiences of workers in both sectors during the crisis is of particular interest. A key 
government response to the crisis involved reform of the public sector, including the 
imposition of a series of direct pay cuts on public sector workers. These cuts are evident in 
2008/2009 and 2009/2010. As noted earlier, the income measure in these data allows us to 
see the effect of the Public Sector Pension Levy in 2009; 62% of public sector workers 
received a pay-cut in the 2008/2009 period. In 2009/2010 the number of public sector 
workers experiencing a pay cut increased to 82%, reflecting direct pay cuts. The median 
worker in the public sector experienced a 6% reduction in earnings. Although there were no 
legislated pay cuts in 2010/2011, 36% of public sector workers received a reduction in annual 
earnings.  
The earnings change distributions for private sector workers also reveal a significant 
response to the crisis. The proportion experiencing pay cuts increased from 23% in the year 
immediately preceding the crisis to almost 50% in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. The figure for 
2010/2011 remained high at 40%. In 2009/2010, the median earnings change in the private 
sector was zero. However, this masks the fact that 47% of private sector workers received a 
pay cut in this period, while about the same proportion received pay increases. This analysis 
clearly reveals the dynamic and heterogeneous response of earnings in the Irish labour market 
during the crisis, a response that can be seen only by looking at this type of data. 
 The histograms reported in Figures 2 and 3 for public and private sector workers 
respectively show these earnings dynamics in more detail. Looking at Figure 2, we see the 
clear shift to the left of the earnings change distribution for public sector workers, 
representing the substantial cuts in earnings for workers in this sector over the crisis period. 
We also see the emergence of a strong spike at zero for public sector workers in 2010/2011 
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which was entirely absent for these workers prior to the crisis.
7
 The histograms for private 
sector workers are in keeping with the discussion for all workers; a persistent spike at zero 
that increased dramatically during the crisis, combined with a substantial increase in the 
proportion of workers receiving pay cuts at the height of the crisis. 
 
b. Analysis of EU-SILC Data 
As mentioned earlier, the JC data comprises the population of workers and the information is 
taken from employers’ tax forms, so has the advantage that it is unlikely to be subject to 
measurement error. However a disadvantage of these data is that the income period is annual 
and therefore changes in annual earnings may reflect changes in hours worked as well as 
changes in the rates of pay. To examine this in more detail, we look at the EU-SILC data. 
These data are survey-based and have much smaller sample sizes, but they do contain 
information on hours worked, allowing the construction of an hourly pay rate. A comparison 
of wage changes using EU-SILC and JC will be useful in helping understand the dynamics 
presented earlier.  
We begin by comparing the dynamics for annual earnings presented for the JC data 
reported above with similar summary measures based on the EU-SILC data. As discussed 
above, the restrictions on the EU-SILC sample are similar to those used for the JC analysis. 
We examine gross annual earnings from the EU-SILC data.  
Table 3 shows the results from EU-SILC, alongside the results from JC, reproduced 
from Table 1. Looking first at the median changes, we see that with the exception of 
2008/2009, both data sets give very similar aggregate results. In both data sets, earnings 
growth fell from about 6% in 2005/2006 to about 4.5% in 2007/2008. Furthermore, both data 
                                                          
7
 There are, however, substantial spikes away from zero; there was strict adherence to the national wage 
agreements in the public sector, so these spikes are likely to correspond to the wage rises from these agreements.  
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sets indicate negative earnings growth in 2009/2010 and very small positive earnings growth 
in 2010/2011. The only difference between the two series arises in 2008/2009, where the EU-
SILC earnings data shows that the median rise in earnings was 5% in 2008/2009, while the 
JC data reports a median fall of 0.6%. This can be explained by the fact that, as mentioned 
above, 2009 was the year in which the Public Sector Pension Levy took effect. This levy did 
not reduce the measure of earnings used in the EU-SILC (gross earnings), but did reduce the 
measure of earnings used in the JC data (taxable earnings).  
The trends in the proportions receiving earnings freezes, cuts or increases are also 
similar across the two data sets. Both data sets show a rise in the proportion receiving 
earnings cuts and a fall in the proportion receiving earnings increases during the crisis. In 
both datasets, about 6% of workers receive a pay freeze in 2010/2011 compared to 2.5% in 
2005/2006. As well as the difference in the 2008/2009 figures previously discussed, other 
year pairs do show differences in the levels of pay cuts and pay rises. However, in many 
years, the differences are small. For example, in both datasets the proportion of workers 
receiving an earnings cut reached a high of over 50% in 2009/2010 as the effect of the 
recession hit Irish workers hardest, before falling to just under 40% in 2010/2011. The 
heterogeneity in earnings responses revealed above in the JC data is also evident in the EU-
SILC data; while many workers were receiving earnings cuts during the crisis, a substantial 
proportion (over 40%) continued to receive earnings increases. 
It has been well documented (e.g. Walsh, 2012) that firms in Ireland responded to the 
crisis in part by adjusting hours of work, which would be reflected in changes in annual 
earnings with no corresponding change in hourly pay. The primary advantage of using the 
EU-SILC data is that it provides data on hours worked and therefore allows us to examine 
dynamics in hourly pay. The results are given in Table 4; to allow comparison, we reproduce 
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the EU-SILC results on annual earnings from Table 3 in the first five columns. The most 
notable difference between the two series is the significant increase in workers who reported 
a pay freeze when using hourly pay as opposed to annual pay; over 12% of workers reported 
hourly pay freezes in 2010/2011 compared to 6% with annual freezes. Despite this difference, 
the major features of wage dynamics reported earlier for annual earnings using both the JC 
and EU-SILC data are still very evident when we use hourly pay. The proportion of workers 
receiving a cut in hourly pay increased from below 30% in 2004/2005 to almost 50% in 
2009/2010, as the labour market reacted significantly to the crisis. As before the cuts 
experienced by many workers are hidden in aggregate data by the fact that at the same time, 
at the height of the crisis, a significant proportion of workers continued to receive increases in 
hourly pay.  
Since the EU-SILC data are survey-based, they are more likely to suffer from 
measurement error than the JC data.
8
 To examine the likely impact of measurement error on 
the EU-SILC findings, we follow Smith (2000). She examined the impact of measurement 
error on wage dynamics in the BHPS using the fact that respondents in the BHPS were told 
that they could consult their pay slips when answering the wage question. On the assumption 
that measurement error should be lower for those who consult their pay slips, a comparison of 
the two groups illustrates the impact of measurement error on wage changes. The EU-SILC 
data allows us to conduct a similar comparison. The results are given in Table 5. Our findings 
are similar to Smith (2000) in that we find that the proportion of workers reporting wage 
freezes is smaller when the sample is restricted to those workers who consulted their pay slip. 
As noted earlier, this is not consistent with classical measurement error but is consistent with 
rounding of reported earnings. While there are some differences in the levels of freezes, cuts 
and increases across the two samples, the broad features of wage dynamics highlighted 
                                                          
8
 As noted earlier, the EU-SILC earnings data is subject to extensive cleaning prior to public release. 
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throughout this analysis remain evident when we restrict our attention to workers who 
consulted their wage slips. These results suggest that measurement error is not the driving 
force behind our findings. 
 
6. Conclusion 
A large body of macroeconomic research emphasizes the role of wage rigidity in accounting 
for unemployment. Excess supply in any market is typically eliminated by price reductions. 
Downward inflexible wages could prevent labour markets from clearing, causing 
unemployment to persist. However there is also a literature that argues that under depression-
type conditions, with interest rates close to zero, wage flexibility will have little impact on 
unemployment and may exacerbate the problem. 
In this paper we look at nominal wage flexibility in Ireland both before and during the 
Great Recession. Previous attempts to measure wage rigidity have been hampered by small 
samples and measurement error. Our main analysis is based on earnings data for the entire 
population of workers in Ireland taken from tax returns filed by their employers. Since it is a 
criminal offense to misreport taxable earnings, we are confident that these data are free of the 
misreporting that can plague survey data. We also use a supplementary dataset in order to 
account for changes in hours worked.  
We find a significant degree of downward wage flexibility in the pre-crisis period in 
both annual earnings and hourly wages. We also observe a significant response in wage 
change behaviour since the crisis began. The proportion of workers receiving wage cuts more 
than doubles and the spike at zero increases substantially, particularly in 2010/2011. 
However, there is substantial heterogeneity of wage changes, with a significant proportion of 
workers continuing to receive pay rises at the same time as other were receiving pay cuts. 
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Our analysis confirms previous research that Ireland’s labour market is a flexible one. It is 
important to take this into account when devising policies to address the severe 
unemployment crisis in Ireland.   
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Table 1: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data 
All Job Stayers 
 Median 
Change 
(2) 
% 
Freezes 
(3) 
% 
Cuts   
(4) 
% 
Increases 
(5) 
Nominal 
Wage 
Rigidity 
(3)/((3)+(4)) 
      
2005/2006 0.060 .025 .172 .804 .126 
2006/2007 .061 .025 .176 .799 .124 
2007/2008 .045 .028 .229 .742 .110 
2008/2009 -.006 .033 .527 .440 .060 
2009/2010 -.011 .044 .552 .403 .074 
2010/2011 .006 .068 .393 .539 .147 
 
 
Table 2: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data 
Public and Private Job Stayers 
 All Public Sector Private Sector 
 Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increa
ses 
             
2005/
2006 
0.060 .025 .172 .804 .061 .005 .171 .824 .059 .030 .172 .798 
2006/
2007 
.061 .025 .176 .799 .068 .005 .153 .843 .059 .030 .180 .791 
2007/
2008 
.045 .028 .229 .742 .046 .006 .218 .775 .044 .034 .231 .735 
2008/
2009 
-.006 .033 .527 .440 -.019 .013 .617 .375 -.001 .041 .501 .458 
2009/
2010 
-.011 .044 .552 .403 -.061 .010 .816 .182 0 .057 .471 .472 
2010/
2011 
.006 .068 .393 .539 .010 .048 .363 .589 .004 .078 .399 .522 
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Table 3: Earnings Dynamics, EU-SILC and Job Churn Data 
All Job Stayers 
Nominal Annual Earnings EU SILC Nominal Annual Earnings Job Churn 
(Taken from Table 1) 
 N 
 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
 Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
2004-
2005 
 
1599 .067 .026 .278 .696      
2005-
2006 
1705 .063 .025 .273 .703  0.060 .025 .172 .804 
2006-
2007 
1567 .069 .028 .234 .738  .061 .025 .176 .799 
2007-
2008 
1490 .047 .036 .283 .680  .045 .028 .229 .742 
2008-
2009 
1294 .051 .009 .342 .650  -.006 .033 .527 .440 
2009-
2010 
1254 -.003 .013 .504 .482  -.011 .044 .552 .403 
2010-
2011 
863 .009 .058 .394 .548  .006 .068 .393 .539 
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Table 4: Earnings and Hourly Wage Dynamics, EU-SILC 
All Job Stayers  
Nominal Annual Earnings Nominal Hourly Wages 
 N 
 
Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
N Median 
change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
2004-
2005 
 
1599 .067 .026 .278 .696 1558 .061 .051 .283 .676 
2005-
2006 
1705 .063 .025 .273 .703 1668 .061 .046 .277 .678 
2006-
2007 
1567 .069 .028 .234 .738 1540 .060 .037 .275 .688 
2007-
2008 
1490 .047 .036 .283 .680 1484 .049 .051 .290 .659 
2008-
2009 
1294 .051 .009 .342 .650 1267 .025 .069 .361 .570 
2009-
2010 
1254 -.003 .013 .504 .482 1214 0 .086 .479 .436 
2010-
2011 
863 .009 .058 .394 .548 835 0 .122 .456 .423 
 
Table 5: Earnings Dynamics, EU-SILC 
Job Stayers with Pay Slips and All Job Stayers 
  Pay Slips Available  All (Taken from Table 3) 
 N Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
N Median 
Change 
% 
Freezes 
% 
Cuts 
% 
Increases 
2006-
2007 
352 .064 .026 .216 .759 1567 .069 .028 .234 .738 
2007-
2008 
830 .049 .016 .270 .714 1490 .047 .036 .283 .680 
2008-
2009 
690 .052 .006 .343 .651 1294 .051 .009 .342 .650 
2009-
2010 
651 -.015 .005 .539 .456 1254 -.003 .013 .504 .482 
2010-
2011 
434 .011 .039 .387 .573 863 .009 .058 .394 .548 
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Figure 1: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data: All Job Stayers 
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Figure 2: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data: Public Sector Job Stayers 
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Figure 3: Earnings Dynamics, Job Churn Data: Private Sector Job Stayers 
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